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Glannon (1) summarized recent research in Biological Psychiatry and discussed possible
ethical implications of mind–brain dualism in psychiatry in this journal. He particularly
addressed the risk that patients might disregard neuroscientific discoveries and subsequently
neglect effective biological treatments for psychiatric disorders. In this opinion article, I want to
emphasize how some philosophers and scientists still use dualistic language, leading researchers
and, to a lesser degree, clinicians into unnecessary and possibly even confused debates on mind–
body reductionism; I also briefly address empirical data suggesting that, in contrast to Glannon,
patients at large presently don’t seem to eschew biological treatments.FROM SOUL-BODY TO MIND–BRAIN DUALISM
René Descartes distinguished a thinking substance (soul) and extended substance (body) and
hypothesized, based on his physiological studies, that both interact primarily in humans’ pineal
gland (2, 3). Already his contemporaries criticized the lacking explanation of the mechanism of
interaction between brain/body and soul, as documented, for example, in the letters between
Descartes and Princess Elisabeth of the Palatinate (4). Even centuries later, philosophers and
neuroscientists have pointed out that the language use of many scholars remains problematically
dualistic, even when they believe to have long overcome mind–brain dualism (5).
Glannon favors a biopsychosocial stance on psychiatric disorders, acknowledging social,
psychological, and neural factors. But he frequently mentions “mind–brain interaction”, though,
without explaining this concept. This reiterates Descartes’ unsolved problem. Philosophy of
Mind has found no clear answer to the question what “the mind” is. One of the major schools of
psychology, Behaviorism, actually found the whole concept suspicious and in need of replacement
by more scientific terms (6); a similar idea was later formulated by philosophers as Eliminative
Materialism (7). Speaking of “the mind” as if it were a thing interacting with the brain/body (1, 8) is
thus by no means trivial.g June 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 6051
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Instead, I propose to speak of processes which are psychological
processes if and only if they fall under a psychological
description. Similar to Dennett’s Intentional Stance (9), this is
a pragmatical proposal that requires no strict commitment about
whether psychological descriptions will ever be reducible to
neuroscientific (or even more basic: physical) descriptions.
This is also reflected in psychological experimentation—as well
as clinical or cognitive neuroscience inasmuch as they make use
of psychological concepts—where researchers operationalize
psychological concepts to explain people’s experience and
behavior without necessarily placing them “in the mind” or
reducing them to the brain. Reductions are much less common
even in the natural sciences than often assumed in that debate,
anyway: Biology and chemistry, for example, are obviously
necessary, because there are processes in the world (e.g. life)
which cannot be described in purely physical language. And it is
also not clear what the final, most basic level of a physical
description should be (10, 11). That of energy, information, or
yet something different? Thus, perhaps not even all physical
descriptions might be reducible to the most basic physical level of
description, whatever that may be.
The sciences, including human and social sciences like
psychology, sociology, and economics, continue to develop in a
pluralistic, non-reductive way, informing each other in many
respects. And a much more promising alternative to reductive
explanations are mechanistic explanations (12, 13). They
integrate different levels of description, instead of replacing
them. I will use an example to briefly explain what this could
mean for psychiatric disorders.AN EXAMPLE
Imagine Karla hearing that her spouse and children died in a
traffic accident. Although that accident involved all kinds of
physical and biological processes, described as changes of
energy matter, molecules, tissues, and so on, they cannot
express the significance for Karla that her beloved ones passed
away so suddenly. But we need not assume an independent,
reified1 “mind” to state that at the moment she understands
(psychology) the message, all kinds of processes will occur in her:
Karla might first react with denial (psychology), a severe stress
response might happen in her body (physiology), electric
activity and molecules may change in her nervous system
(neurophysiology) and likely also affect some neural structures
permanently (neuroanatomy).
As time proceeds, Karla probably experiences grief and
perhaps even depression; serious life events are indeed the
strongest known risk factors for distress and Major Depressive
Disorder (MDD) (14, 15). Again, this will also involve processes1The term reification is derived from the Latin res, thing. Reification means thus to
consider something as a thing. Talking about brain–mind-interaction thus
assumes that there are two entities, brain and mind, which are interacting in
some way.
Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 2on different levels, as described before, including neuroscientific
levels. Glannon actually summarizes much neuroscientific
research consistent with such multi-level descriptions. We may
ask what is specific about hearing that one’s loved ones died
which is causing all these effects; but this does not require us to
posit a “mind” entity mysteriously interacting with the brain.
Instead, a mechanistic explanation can integrate all levels of
description (16), also in line with the biopsychosocial model (17,
18). On the psychological level of description, philosophical
concepts like intentional (e.g. what a thought is about) or
phenomenal content (e.g. what it feels like) that are considered
as unique features of the mental domain can play a role, too (19).
This pluralistic approach has much affinity with the way
psychiatric disorders are classified: In the case of MDD,
symptoms involve cognitive patterns (e.g. guilt or suicidal
ideation), behaviors (e.g. inactivity or a suicide attempt), and
physiological changes (e.g. losing weight). Taking the DSM-5
criteria (20), MDD could be expressed by 227 different variants
of the symptoms, without even taking their severity into
account (21). For attention-deficit-/hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD), actually even more than 10,000 variations could be
distinguished on the basis of the DSM criteria. This demonstrates
a high degree of descriptive heterogeneity of such disorder
categories. As Glannon described, Biological Psychiatry found
neuroscientific patterns statistically correlated with such
instances of MDD and many other disorders. But not a single
one of the hundreds of disorders classified in the DSM can
generally be described, let alone individually diagnosed, on the
neuroscientific level alone (22, 23). Reductionism does not seem
to be a successful paradigm in psychiatry, with clinical
researchers looking for a brain-based nosology since more than
170 years (24), when psychiatric disorders are not generally
classified on the neuroscientific level, cannot be diagnosed on
that level in individual cases, and a patient’s treatment response
cannot be assessed there alone. It has been discussed elsewhere
that this can be partially explained by the limitations of present
methodology (22, 25) or the normativity of psychiatric disorders
(26, 27).IMPLICATIONS FOR PATIENTS’
TREATMENT CHOICES
So far, the discussion was primarily relevant to researchers and,
to a lesser degree, clinicians. Glannon (1) raised concerns about
mind–brain dualism in psychiatry and related patients’
understanding of psychiatric disorders to the risk that they
might eschew effective biological treatments when they take a
limited psychological stance. Besides the new approaches on
brain stimulation described by Glannon, medical consumption
patterns indicate, though, that ever more people are taking
psychopharmacological drugs. For example, the annual
production of ADHD medication in the US is presently higher
than during the whole decade of the 1990s (28). The pattern for
other psychopharmacological drugs (Figure 1) and in many
other countries is similar (30).June 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 605
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stimulating, relaxing, or hallucinogenic drugs) instrumentally,
for their psychological effects, probably as long as we exist (31,
32). The recent neuro-enhancement debate exemplifies a similar
trend to improve one’s cognitive performance or feelings
pharmacologically (28, 33). It thus seems to be common
knowledge in human history that behavior and experience can
be affected by consuming certain substances or performing
particular rituals (e.g. dance, sports, or prayer). Whether or not
many people have dualistic views, believing in the existence of
independent “minds” or “souls”, they nevertheless seem to
endorse biological means to solve their problems or achieve
their aims, perhaps even increasingly so. Many decades ago,
Klerman described that people differ in their readiness to take
pharmacological drugs, distinguishing the extreme poles of
“Psychotropic Hedonism” on the one hand and “Pharmacological
Calvinism” on the other, but rather due to their lifestyle choices
than philosophical world-views (34, 35). After the “Decade of
the Brain” and the Human Genome Project, the analysis of
science communication patterns and people’s descriptions of their
psychiatric problems rather suggest, in contrast to Glannon’s
concern, that patients might presently rather underestimate the
value of psychotherapy, not biological treatments (36, 37).CONCLUSION: INTEGRATION INSTEAD
OF REDUCTION
Variants of dualism have been discussed in philosophy for
centuries. I tried to show here that we neither need to
postulate “souls” nor “minds” to describe people’s behaviors or
experiences. To overcome dualism, reifying “the mind” won’t
help. Using a dualistic language that postulates “mind–brainFrontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org June 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 603interactions” reiterates old questions about the nature of the
mental entity, its mechanism of interaction with the brain/body,
and gives rise to endless discussions on reductionism that neither
seems to be fruitful nor relevant to empirical research in
psychology or the neurosciences. The biopsychosocial model
and mechanistic explanations can take different levels of
descriptions into account, without demanding reductions; as
colleagues and I explained earlier, neuroscience can also be
integrative (38). That people probably always have and are still
using different means to change their brain/body and thus
facilitate certain behaviors and experiences is also rather
compatible with a pluralistic than a dualistic or reductionistic
view. Instead of proposing an either-or-account, it goes without
saying that many biological treatments have psychological effects
(i.e. effects that we can only describe on the psychological level)
and that psychological treatments are changing the brain/body.
To ensure that psychiatric patients can consent to the best
available treatment, it is essential, in my view, that they are
informed in a neutral, pluralistic, and comprehensible way about
all different options.AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
The author confirms being the sole contributor of this work and
has approved it for publication.FUNDING
This publication has been supported by the “History of
Neuroethics” grant by the Dutch Research Foundation
(NWO), grant number 451-15-042.FIGURE 1 | Annual production of the schedule II regulated ADHD drugs amphetamine (red) and methylphenidate (blue, left scale, x 1,000 kg) and adult patients
annually receiving antidepressant drugs in the United States (yellow, right scale, x 1,000,000). The production of the ADHD drugs has increased more than
thirtyfold, the number of MDD patients receiving antidepressants about threefold in the shown period. It must be also noted, though, that in the period shown the
criteria for diagnosing ADHD changed, for example, with respect to adult ADHD and the DSM-5 of 2013 (20). Source: updated from (28), US Federal Register; (29).5
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